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6.4 Dissolution of one state and consequent birth of numerous 
smaller states 
6.4.1 Former Yugoslavia 
At times, achieving reconciliation between groups may necessitate that 
the warring parties or factions be separated and set apart from each 
other. While this is an interesting way of achieving peace and stability and 
possibly even reconciliation, it is somewhat out of step with the conven-
tional understanding that polarised and divided groups need to be brought 
together to learn about each other, to establish dialogue and to see the 
reality of each other's circumstances. The strategy of separating the par-
ties is implemented when the conflict seems so protracted and so divisive 
that peace seems impossible, unless they are segregated on some perma-
nent basis. In these cases the parties are separated into discrete inde-
pendent states to allow each community to rule over itself and deal with 
its issues on its own. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber found that, 
lwjhile previously wars were primarily between well-established States, in mod-
ern imer-ethnic armed conflicts such as that in the former Yugoslavia, new 
States are often created during the conflict and ethnicity rather than nationality 
may become the grounds for allegiance. Or, put another way, ethnicity may 
become determinative of national allegiance. Under these conditions, the re-
quirement of nationality is even less adequate to define protected persons. In 
such conflicts, not only the text and the drafting history of the Convention but 
also, and more importamly, the Convention's object and purpose suggest that 
allegiance to a Party to the conflict and, correspondingly. control by this Party 
over persons in a given territory. may be regarded as the crucial test
S8 
These new states can, therefore, be established in multi-ethnic or heteroge-
neous societies where ethniC, religious, or other differences have been used 
to blame and shame members of other communities. This does not mean 
that separation has been the dominant approach in such cases. On the 
contrary, with globalisation and the opening of borders, the phenomenon of 
88 Judgment of {he Appeals ctlamber. The Prosecutor v Tadic. ICTY case no. IT-94-1. 15 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY 5. DEVELOPMENT 
completely homogenous states is decreasing. As a result, as Will Kymlicka 
asserts: 'Modern societies are increasingly confronted with minority 
groups demanding recognition of their identity, and accommodation of 
their culwral differences,a4 According to Andries Odendaal, there 'is no 
existing constitutional model that can claim to be successful under all 
conditions. In judged from a historical perspective, the prognosis for 
multi-ethnic states succeeding in solving ethnic conflict in a non-violent 
manner is rather poor' GO Yet the reality is that heterogeneous societies 
have become the norm and the communities that live in those states find 
ways of accommodating each other. There are, however, heterogeneous 
states with intractable conflict and instability that seem unable 1O find a 
resolution or model acceptable to all. While the conflict in these states 
might well concern access to resources and power. existing divisions are 
used as fault lines. Examples of the countries in which the option of 
separation has been chosen include India and Bangladesh. Israel and 
Palestine, and the states that have emerged out of the former Yugoslavia. 
This process of separation, which sees a state split into one or more 
new independent states, may be necessary to allow each of the groups 1O 
be accommodated separately and peace to be achieved, This route makes 
peace likely and reconciliation possible by 'developing a muwally concilia-
tory accommodation between former enemies' 4 The former Yugoslavia 
constitutes such an example in which separating the parties was regarded 
as the best way forward to achieve peace, stability and. eventually, recon-
ciliation, As was noted by John Mearsheimer in 1998: 'The breakup of 
large countries inlO smaller states can sometimes lead to stability. But 
unless we intend to intervene in Kosovo and to occupy Bosnia and Mace-
donia forever. the only way to stop the spread of violence and civil war is 
to help the antagonists find the best ways to divorce' ," Timothy Sisk 
questions the success of such a partition: 
There are, however. a number of problems inherent in most partition arrange-
ments. First. partition rarely produces a definitive solution to the problems of 
multinational societies, Partition solutions simply rearrange the pattern of mi-
norities and majorities, creating new grievances and establishing new dynamiCS 
of conflict. If Yugoslavia were to be further partitioned and Kosovo recognized 
as an independent state, the problem of an Albanian minority in Yugoslavia 
might be solved, However, a new problem, an aggrieved Serb minority within a 
newly sovereign, Albanian-majority Kosovo, would be created, The only way to 
definitively resolve this problem is forced migration, a solution that is in viola-
tion of international norms,"' 
89 Kymlicka W Multicultural citizenship A liberal theory of minority rights (1995) I 0, 
90 Odendaal A Ethnic conflict and its management. A position paper (1998) Centre for 
Confiier Resolution, Cape Towll 7, 
91 See Stavenhagen R Ethnic conflicts and the nation state (1996) 31, 
92 The comparison with former Yugoslavia is noted by Gross A 'The constitution, recon· 
ciliation, and transitional justice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel' (2004) 40 Stan-
ford}ournal of International Law 47, 55. 
93 Kegley Wand Raymond G (fn 4 above) 237, 
94 Qumed in Sisk TD 'De(~pjy divided and failed states: Democratization in unfavorable 











































PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION (2) 
While peace might be achieved in these circumstances, the separation can 
often retard the process of reconciling the parties, Since they are sepa-
rated and live in different ethnic states, the opportunities to bring the 
communities together and establish dialogue are invariably limited and 
the process is complicated. If reconciliation is sought, it happens very 
slowly and often remains a problem. The ethnic differences and tensions 
can actually increase, but, because the groups are often in different states, 
the tensions can be managed. Yet the pOSSibility of war between these 
states remains, unless it is carefully managed by the respective parties or 
by a regional or other body. 
In the Balkans, divisions along ethnic lines have been present for dec-
ades. Former British Foreign Minister and European Union mediator in 
the conflicts in the Balkans, Lord David Owen, noted thal the issues in the 
region go back to the Second World War.% In fact, some of these divisions 
date back centuries and, for at least a hundred years, mutual accusations 
of human rights abuses have been made. Ostensibly to promote greater 
stability and reduce the power of some groups over others, a new consti-
tution was inaugurated in 1974. This afforded the previous Serbian re-
gions of Kosovo and Vojvodina more autonomy. These regions became 
autonomous but did not achieve the status of republics as was the case 
with Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Like 
the other republics, they were, as autonomous regions, entitled to repre-
sentation in the federal presidency and were allowed their own regional 
parliament and government, their own central banks and police force. 
Accordingly, various previously excluded ethnic groups were now in-
cluded. o7 In this way the divisions between the different groups were 
managed to some degree, although schisms between the various ethniC 
groups ran deep. The divisions along ethnic lines in the region that caused 
ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia are 'Serbo-Croatian in Croatia, 
Serbo-Moslem, and Serbo-Croatian in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbo-
Albanian in yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia'.'s New ethnic tensions are now evident 
between 'Moslem-Croatian in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonian-
Albanian, Macedonian-Bulgarian and Macedonian-Greek'. In addition, 
other potential tensions may emerge, including those between Montene-
grin-Serbian.
99 
In 1990, elections brought new governments in the republics of Slove-
nia, Croatia and Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent of 
yugoslavia in 1990 and Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 
1991. Serbia which, under Siobodan Milosevic. had attempted in [989 to 
96 Owen D 'Reconciliation: Applying historical lessons to modern conflicts' (1995) 19 
Fordham International Law Journal 324. 335. 
97 Human Rights Watch Under orders: War crimes in Kosovo (2004). last accessed on the 
Internet on 8 August 2006 at hrtp:/Iwww.hrw.orglreponsI2001Ikosovo. 
98 Ziatko I 'Democracy, human rights and ethmc conflicts in the process of globalisation' 
(2002) Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper NO.3. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
restrict the autonomous status of those two regions. went to war with 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,'oo 
When Kosovo declared independence, Serbia did not accept its status, 
Groups in Kosovo were placed under stringent rule and the human rights 
of various groups were attacked, In the name of 'ethnic cleansing' hun-
dreds of thousands of people in the region were forcibly driven from their 
homes, endured torture, rape. genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, After going on the offensive against the population in Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milosevic attacked the Albanian popula-
tion in the Serbian province of Kosovo by reviving old hatreds and stereo-
types rooted in a flawed view of history manipulated by members of the 
political elite, such as Milosevic himself]OI 
The Dayton peace agreement concluded in December [995 ended the 
fighting in Bosnia and divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two states -
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a 
result of ethnic cleansing, Republika Srpska had a population that was 
almost exclusively Serbian, The conflict resulted in mass flights of peoples 
of certain ethnic groups - in Kosovo about 800,000 Kosovar-Albanians 
fled to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, other parts of the former Yu~oslavia and even other countries, 
Another [00.000 Serbs also fled Kosovo, 02 
To address the atrocities, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former yugoslavia 
since 1991, (lCTY) , was established by SC Res, 827 on May 25. 1993, As a 
consequence, a number of persons have been indicted, prosecuted and 
convicted, The highest profile person indicted was Siobodan Milosevic, 
who remained in power until May 2000, However, in June 2001 the Serb 
government surrendered him to the International Criminal Tribunal on the 
Former Yugoslavia,IO} He is the first serving head of state to have been 
indicted for violating the laws of war and crimes against humanity. While 
he was initially only charged with what was perpetrated against the Kos-
ovo Albanians, the charges were later extended to include grave breaches 
of the Geneva Convention and other violations, such as genocide commit-
ted against Croats and other non-Serbs in the Republic of Croatia, The 
decision of the government to hand him over to the Tribunal for trial has, 
however. been criticised. It was noted that 'fears are growing in Belgrade 
that the trial of Siobodan Milosevic at The Hague is going horribly wrong, 
turning the former Yugoslav President in the eyes of the public from a 
villain charged with war crimes into a Serbian hero' 104 Milosevic's death in 
March 2006. which ended his trial, may see the end of these problems. 
100 Article on BBC website, 'Coumry profile: Serbia and Montenegro', dated 14 July 2004, 
hup:llnews.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/worid/europe/country _pro fiIesl I 039269,strn. 
101 Baroni F 'The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and its mission 
to restore peace' (2000) 12 Pace International Law Review 233,241, 
102 World Bank Technical Paper Kosovo economic and social reforms for peace and 
reconciliation (200 I) 509, 
103 De Than C and Shorts E International criminal law and human rights (2003) 289, 










































PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION (2) 
However, Dayton did not resolve the issues in Kosovo and the continu-
ing attacks on Kosovo prompted the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
sation) decision to use force to stop these attacks. As permanent members 
of the Security Council, Russia and China objected to the intervention and 
were supported by countries such as India and Iraq. China denounced it 
as a 'flagrant violation of international law' .'05 The intervention was wel-
comed by NATO member states and supported by Eastern European 
governments like Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Poland and the Czech 
Republic. On March 25, 1999, the Security Council dismissed a resolution, 
proposed by the Russian Federation, Belarus and India, condemning 
Operation Allied Force as being unlawful, by a vote of 12 to 3. 
As far as attitudes are concerned, as a measure of reconciliation, a 1999 
survey of Kosovo Albanians found that 86 percent of men and 89 percent 
of women had strong feelings of hatred towards the Serbs and 51 percent 
of men and 43 percent of women desired revenge most or all of the 
time. 'oo Ethnic intolerance has remained a major problem and violence 
has continued. 
Nonetheless, there have been moments of reconciliation. One of those 
was when Republika Srpska Prime Minister, Dragan Mikerevic, went to a 
funeral for those killed at Srebrenica in July 2003 and acknowledged that 
it was 'obvious that a crime was committed in Srebrenica'. Although he 
was criticised for only attending the funeral because of pressure from the 
international community, for inadequately expressing his feelings and for 
lack of attendance by other Bosnian Serbs, this acknowledgement - not 
only that the event had taken place, but that it was a crime - represented 
a positive step in the reconciliatory process. 107 This was enhanced in 
October 2003 when Mikerevic announced that the Republika Srpska 
government would establish a Committee for Truth to deal with the 
Srebrenica massacre. Another example occurred when Croatian President 
Stipe Mesic visited Serbia and Montenegro. During this visit the two 
presidents took the opportunity to apologise for 'all evils' that were car-
ried out by their countries during the 1991- I 995 war. 108 Thus, the leaders 
of the two states made public statements of atonement which may affect 
general attitudes in those countries towards the citizens of the other state. 
It certainly makes the public relationship between these two states more 
cordial. 
6.5 Decolonisation: a call for further reconciliation 
"'Colonisation" deSignates a process of territorial acquisition, "colony" a 
particular type of socio-political organisation, and "colonialism" a system 
of domination. The basis of all three concepts is the notion of expansion 
105 See The Times l.ondon 26 March (1999) 6. 
106 Summerfield D 'Effects of war: Moral knowledge. revenge. reconciliation. and medical-
ised concepts of "recovery'" (2002) 325 British MedicalJournal I 105 at I 106. 
107 Transitions Online 'OJ reckoning and reconciliation' 14 July 2003. 
108 The Independent 'After the war crimes and genOCide. old Balkan Foes make up' 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
of a society beyond its original habitat,.,09 When the 'expanded' society 
finally departs and allows the colonised people to choose their independ-
ence, a series of problems are left behind; 'post-colonialism' does not mean 
after-colonialism. Rather, 'it begins when the colonizers arrive and doesn't 
finish when they go home ... The term "postcolonial society" does not 
mean an historical left-over of colonialism, but a society continuously 
responding in all its myriad ways to the experience of colonial contact'. lIO 
Pal Ahluwalia's definition of reconciliation, which examines the etymo-
logical roots of the word, fits perfectly into the decolonisation model of 
incernational reconciliation. For him '(re)conciliation entails returning to a 
prior stage. a stage where there was conciliation'.'" However true. it is 
difficult to speak of a past conciliation where the enmity is so deeply 
rooted that it seems impossible that the people had ever experienced real 
conciliation and peaceful coexistence. as is the case with the century-long 
Franco-German enmity. Yet. in a post-colonial situation, it is often possi-
ble that an original state of conciliation eXisted before colonisation. In 
Rwanda, for example. the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority peacefully 
coexisted prior to colonisation. but colonial policy rendered them separate 
and incompatible communities. In the momenc of decolonisation. the 
coloniser. who had unci I then encouraged Tutsi dominance, reversed the 
practices of governance and aided the Hutu to prevail over the Tutsi.' 
While the indigenous people often lived in harmonious cohabitation. con-
ciliation between the colonised and their colonisers obviously did not 
exist. Because the very act of colonisation has a fundamentally rupturing 
effect on the previously colonised society. it is impossible (0 achieve 
reconciliation by simply attempting to return (0 the pre-colonial situation. 
Incernational policies of reconciliation cannot return societies to a time of 
pre-existing conciliation. because their histories do not comprise periods 
of real harmony and peaceful coexistence between the former colonialist 
powers and the former colonies. Colonialism fundamentally alters the 
basis of societies by tampering with historical trajectories. A (otally new 
'conciliation' between the two actors of the colonialist scene is required in 
order (0 deal with the collective trauma left behind by former colonisers. 
Ethnic divisions and racial discrimination imposed on Africans by the 
colonisers are not the only factors that brought Africa to a spiral of internal 
109 This plain det"inition is quoted by Osterhammel J Colonialism. A theoretical overview 
(1999) 4. 
j 10 If this definition is accepted, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 can only be understood 
through the lens of the country's whole colonial historical background. The abovemen-
tioned description or the rerm post-colonialism is cited by Bill Ashcroft, quoted by Ahlu-
walia P 'Towards (re)conciliation: Tile postcolonial economy of giving' in Goldberg D 
and Quayson A (eds): Relocating postcolontalism (2002) at 191 196. 
I j I Ibid 197. 
112 The Belgian colonisation, which started in 1916 and ended in 1962, polarised the 
indigenous identities into Hum, Tutsi and Twa. For Ahluwalia 'the very structures of co-
lonialism continue to predominate within post-colonial Rwanda with the process of 
identity formation firmly locked into the representations and practices once ascribed 
by the colonial power. Hence, for a people inseparable in terms of culture, language 
and religion, it is the colonial identily card that above all becomes the signifier of the 










































PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION (2) 
violence and civil wars. The arbitrary setting of' boundaries constructed a 
number of states as artificial creations of the European imperial powers. 
Heedless of pre,existing nations. ethnicities. states. kingdoms and em-
pires, these boundaries formed multi-ethnic states fomenting ethno, 
cultural hatreds.' 
Decolonisation. therefore, reqUires the reconciliation policy to assume 
two different forms: one national. to take place within the indigenous 
people, often left in a state of ethnic division which easily degenerates 
into civil wars; and one international, to take place between the ex-colon, 
ial power and the Former colony. Only the latter. being a foreign policy 
negotiated between two different countries. falls within the scope of the 
present paper. 
At the global level, an important expression of reconciliation can be 
debt cancellation of decolonised countries (money atonement or financial 
forgiveness or monetary debt forgiveness). It entails that the country that 
mainly profited from exploiting the former colony chooses [Q stop the 
spiral of debt, interest. more borrowing and further impoverishment. and 
finally frees the decolonised country from the last residue of colonisation 
- financial dependence. 
6.5.1 France faces its Algerian sins 
Since 2000. France has confronted the ghosts of the Algerian War, reani, 
mated by revelations of key French military actors concerning the practice 
of torture, disappearances and summary killings by French forces in 
[ 954, [ 962. In this period Algerian nationalists struggled and ultimately 
secured their country's independence from French colonial rule. In Sep' 
tember 1959. Charles De Gaulle announced that the Algerian people 
would be permitted [Q exercise their right to self-determination." 4 As 
Raoul Ageron points our: 'The Algerian War was not viewed simply as a 
belated conflict in the broader historical process of decolonisation. A 
segment of the French population, most particularly French nationals in 
Algeria, experienced this war as a national tragedy' .'5 Algerian independ-
ence could only be seen as a 'national tragedy' if one considers the politi, 
cal position held by the French elite of the period. In the early 1950s 
every single significant political figure declared that there was only one 
way to respond [Q Algerian claims to independence: war. The public f'ace 
of France clearly opposed any pOSSibility of mediation with the FNL and. 
as Smith points out. 'from the outset of the war. not only the French 
public. but the French army particularly. were given to believe that France 
was fighting to retain Algeria,."b The public position of 'no compromise' 
was colluding with the more realistic private position of many politicians 
who actually knew that independence would be inevitable. Because the 
) 13 For a broader analysis of the colonial legacy, see Boahen A African perspectives on 
colomalism (1994) 94·) 12. 
1 14 Eftekhari S 'France and the Algerian War: From a policy of "forgetting" to a framework 
for accoumability' (2003) 34 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 414.417. 
1 15 Ageron R quoted in Eftekhari S (fn I J 4 above) 414. 418. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
real aim was to allow an honourable loss of the region, the French army 
had been sent there ro give Algeria away while retaining control of the 
baulefield so that France could negotiate from a position of strength. De 
Gaulle handled the situation in the same contradictory manner. The logic 
of the time was that France was to win the battle in order to lose the 
war."l The impasse was to be solved in a brusque way by De Gaulle, 
when, in April 1961, he announced that France was not going to object to 
any Algerian attempt to organise itself as an independent state. The 
abrupt decision to offer independence on a silver plate after six long years 
of war fought under different banners, led the way to a serious political 
crisis, dotted with altem pted coups and terrorist attacks. 118 
During peace negotiations in the City of Evian, France promised to ex-
tend economic aid to its former colony and preserve cultural ties. Follow-
ing the Evian Accords, French colonists opposed to decolonisation 
launched a final, desperate attack against French armed forces that they 
regarded as occupiers. April 1962 saw the exodus of many French resi-
dents from Algeria, but the extremists pursued their armed opposition 
until June of that year. In this chaotic period, the French government 
deserted those Algerians known as harkis, who had fought on the French 
side. Although a number of harkis were able to settle in France, tens of 
thousands remaining in Algeria were killed in reprisals by nationalists 
following independence. Finally, on July I, 1962, Algerians voted for inde-
pendence by a large majority. 
In a formal sense, the loss of Algeria signalled the demise of the French 
empire and the culmination of a long decolonisation process. But such a 
view neglects the psycho-social consequences of the rupture. Having lost 
its status as a 'Great Power' because of World War II, France had come to 
rely on its colonies for the preservation of its hisrorical and cullUral gran-
deur. Algeria's liberation thus provoked a crisis of French consciousness, 
with President de Gaulle presiding over the ceremonial end of the empire."" 
The post-I 962 period in France echoes the context of emerging democ-
racies. The newly born Fifth Republic needed a stable foundation and 
could not pOSSibly flourish on scandals and horror revelations regarding 
the Algerian issue. Thus the political system discouraged the prosecution 
and punishment, if not the simple acknowledgment, of French abuses in 
Algeria. However, the seriousness with which the Rwandan inquiry has 
recently been undertaken seems to reflect an environment favourable to a 
critical examination of French crimes during the Algerian War. France's 
present re-examination of the abuses by its forces in Algeria demonstrates 
that the reconciliation process is not only ongoing, but sometimes also 
necessary, even after a long lapse of time. 
France has always kept a privileged relationship with its former North-
African colonies, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The annual amount of 
I 17 See Smith J (fn I 16 above) 83. 
1 18 Smith talks about a 'political dissonance trap' as one of the main obstacles to cease-
fires. See Smith J (fn I 16 above) 73- I 02. 










































PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACHIEVING RECONCII,JATlON(2) 
money donated by the French government to these countries for devel-
opment purposes is more than 330 million Euros. In addition, the pres-
ence in France of around three million immigrants from this region 
requires both a healthy national policy towards these communities and an 
attentive foreign policy towards the abovementioned former colonies and 
their inhabitants. '2o The relationship between France and these countries 
can easily reflect the type of policy on French citizens of Algerian, Moroc-
can and Tunisian origins. It thereFore seems short-sighted to regard the 
international reconciliation policy (between France and Algeria, for exam-
ple) separately from what is being done on the national level towards the 
communities of North African origin living in the country of the former 
coJoniser. To succeed at the international level, a reconciliation policy 
should be implemented in a coherent manner - through policies that 
facilitate immigration, settling (for example housing and schooling) and 
integration of immigrants coming from the former colonies, as well as 
through international economic aid and financial support for development 
plans and enterprise projects in the territory of the ex-colonies. 
6.5.2 Financial support to a dictatorship or a coup: US policy in 
Nicaragua 
In 1979 Nicaragua's former dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, and his 
regime were overthrown in a democratic revolution led by the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional (FSNL or the Sandinistas). At first, the 
socialist Sandinista government under the Presidency of Daniel Ortega 
was favourably regarded, recognised and finanCially supported by the 
United States. However, as early as 1981 the American attitude towards 
the Nicaraguan socialist government swiftly changed, although diplomatic 
relations were not interrupted. Nicaragua was, and still is, of crucial 
importance to the United States because of its proximity to the Panama 
Canal. The United States feared that if Nicaragua's wave of SOcialism were 
to consolidate, the Soviets and the Cubans would become the dominant 
powers controlling this fundamental corridor between North and South 
America. Furthermore, the Reagan Administration feared that the Sand-
inista revolution would affect other neighbouring areas, quickly spreading 
socialism to EI Salvador, Guatemala and the Honduras, and in the longer 
term, to Costa Rica, Panama and even Mexico. 
As far back as [982, when the Central Intelligence Agency reshuf-
fled the original contras leadership, it had already became clear that the 
United States was supporting the rebels in Nicaragua. It was only four 
years later that the seriousness of the American role in the region became 
120 The information is available on the website of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres: 
http://www.diplornatie.gouv.fr within Dossier pays: Afrique du Nord. Note de fond sur fa 
France et Ie Maghreb. Reprinted at http://www.diplornatie.gouvJrlactu/article.asp?an 
35103 (accessed 12 May 20(4). 
121 For a detailed analysis of Latin Arnerica's history of transition, see Daly M 'The US and 
Latin America: A lost decade?' (1988/1989) 68 Foreign Affairs J 80- J 98. 
122 For a further discussion on [he 'domino-effect' theory, see Krauss C 'Revolurion in 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
internationally recognised. In 1986. the United States House of Represen-
tatives approved the expenditure of $100 million in aid to support. di-
rectly or indirectly. military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, 
aimed at overthrowing the Sandinista government. Shortly afterwards, the 
real extent of the American intervention became evident when it was 
shown that some $10 to $30 million had been diverted from the profits 
the United States made through secret arms sales to Iran.l23 
The ethics of the American policy of recruiting. financing, advising, 
training and supplying the contras (rebel groups which have been charged 
with numerous atrocities and human rights abuses) were formally ques-
tioned in 1986 when the issue was brought to the attention of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 124 In its judgment on the matter it becomes c1ear
l2O 
that the US had been responsible. not only indirectly through the actions 
of the contras, but also directly through some of its own agents. for kid-
napping, torturing, raping, illegally detaining and killing a number of 
civilians and prisoners. Among other things, the United States was found 
guilty of infringing international customary law by intervening in the 
internal affairs of Nicaragua.
126 
Yet, the Court was not able to hold the 
government of the United States fully responsible for the violations of the 
laws and customs of warfare committed by the contra forces in Nicara-
gua. I '7 It carefully premised this result on the finding that it had insuffi-
cient evidence to reach a definitive conclusion on such a delicate matter. 
Nevertheless, the Court held it established that the United States govern-
ment largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the con-
tras. In an effort to minimize that criticism, the Court apparently decided 
to avoid adjudicating the politically charged issue of whether United States 
government officials were personally responsible for any degree of com-
plicity in the commission of international crimes by contra forces against 
the civilian population of Nicaragua.
12
" 
The international scandal caused by the findings and the judgment of the 
International Court of justice triggered a new American policy of financial 
support to Nicaragua. At present. the United States is involved in a number 
of developing projects: support for justice reform projects. modernising 
legal codes; strengthening judicial system institutions; strengthening civil 
society; improving governmental transparency; and improving political 
participation in the electoral process through fair elections. The United 
States also provides grants to civil society organisations that protect 
human rights, and helps farmers with technical assistance and training 
123 Ibid 564-581 . 
124 The judgment of [he ICj. delivered un 27 June 1986, is available in its Report. See 
Nicaragua v. USA 1986: ICJ International Law Reports 76, 349. 
125 The judgment of the Cuurt on this malter is actually not clear, because, in the Court's 
estimation, it remained tu be proven that the Reagan administration actually exercised 
operational control over the contra furces. 
126 See Nicaragua v. USA (fn 124 above) 349. 
127 For a critical assessment uf the Coun's judgment, see Boyle F 'Determining US respon-
sibility for Contra operations under international law' (1987) 81 American journal oj In-
ternational Law 86-93. 
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aimed at encouraging crop diversification and environmentally sustain-
able farming methods. These programmes can assist in promoting 
reconciliation between these states. However, the depth of the antago-
nism and the wounds caused by the past might be toO deep for such 
programmes to achieve their goals. The USA's role in world politics and its 
economic position may also be an impediment to reconciliation. 
7 CIVIL WAR THAT HAS REGIONAL ROOTS AND REQUIRES 
REGIONAL RECONCILIATION 
7.1 Transboundary conflicts 
In the past two decades, West Africa has been affected by a cycle of 
recurring violence and destruction associated with various national wars, 
Reconciliation between the groups has remained an ongoing problem, 
partly because issues of governance and access to and control of re-
sources remain major obstacles. 
The war in Liberia broke out in J 989 and then spread to neighbouring 
Sierra Leone, when the Liberian-backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
entered the country to overthrow the Sierra Leonean government. Since 
its independence from the United Kingdom in 1961, Sierra Leone had 
been a highly unstable state. In the following years, Guinea became the 
unwilling host of thousands of refugees from the wars in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. At the same time, Guinea played an active role in the conflicts by 
supporting and sheltering the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy), the Liberian militia operative against Liberian President 
Charles Taylor. During the conflict the LURD became one of the most 
violent groups across the borders, responsible for some of the worst 
human right abuses against civilians. Many combatants came from these 
two countries, showing another terrifying plight of the region: the exis-
tence of a destabilizing pool of fighters ready to participate in any war 
available. Their survival was guaranteed through the pillaging and exploi-
tation of natural resources and civilian goods. The involvement in the 
conflicts of other states was a recurrent element in the foreign policies of 
many neighbouring countries. President Taylor, who officially played no 
part in the wars in Sierra Leone and Guinea, did, in fact, give massive 
support to rebel armies in both countries, The same tendency can be 
detected in most countries of the main regional grouping, the Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), Officially ECOWAS has, 
for a decade, tried to play the role of regional peacemaker and honest 
broker. However, clandestinely, things were rather different. At the height 
of the war in Liberia in the mid-I 990s many private militias operating in 
Liberia were receiving aid from one or other ECOWAS member state, 
while ECOWAS as a community was the sponsor of a regional peacekeep-
ing force. 
129 For further details on US monetary aid given [Q Nicaragua, see the US Agency for 
Imcrnarional Development's website: http://www.usaid,gov. Reprinted a[ http://www. 
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In June 1998, the UN became involved in the conflict with the estab-
lishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOM-
SIL), Its mandate was to implement the program for the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of combatants (DDR), to report on the 
security situation and to monitor for international humanitarian 
laws. The fragility of the Sierra Leonean government and the weakness of 
the state pushed towards the creation of a reconciliatory solution aimed at 
ending the conflict and establishing an all-inclusive government. In 1999, 
the government entered into negotiations with the rebels and signed the 
Lome Peace Agreement With the aim of 'promoting full respect for 
human rights and humanitarian law', the Lome Agreement proVided 
pardon and amnesty to 'all combatants and collaborawrs in respect of 
anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives' ,IlO absolving them of 
responsibility for the vicious crimes they committed since 1991. In par-
ticular, the same absolute and free pardon was to be granted to Corporal 
Foday Sankoh. Moreover, the Lome Agreement ensured that no offiCial or 
judicial action would be taken against any member of the RUF.'31 The RUF 
never fully complied with the terms of the accord, which soon broke 
down, 
Shortly after the evident failure of the Lome Agreement, the UN Security 
Council authorised the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to replace the previous force, which lacked 
military power. At the same time, the United Kingdom enlarged its com-
mitment to bring peace to Sierra Leone, while neighbouring Guinea inter-
vened directly in the conflict by striking back at the RUF. The combination 
of the new UN peacekeeping force and military backup from the United 
Kingdom made demobilization attractive to fighters, triggering a cycle of 
desertion that caused the war to start fading, 
Meanwhile, Guinea became the theatre of another nalional conflict. The 
Guinean government responded to the heavy fighting through reprisals 
against refugees and groups of civilians suspected of being mercenaries. 
Apart from Guinea, Senegal and Liberia are also involved in ongOing or 
recurrent fighting. Although Sierra Leone recently witnessed a pause in 
the violence, it, too, could easily Fall into the spiral of war again, together 
with Cote d'ivoire and Guinea Bissau, The vicious cycle of warmongering 
will not cease until the true causes of the conFlict are addressed in the 
region as a whole. Reconciliation needs to be brought about between 
these war-ravaged countries, bringing together leaders committed to 
peace and giving people of different nations a chance to share their com-
mon wounds. Nigeria's stability is also threatened by its proximity to the 
fighting and the transboundary nature of the bordering conflicts. If the 
war were to spread to Nigeria, the West African issue could no longer be 
130 See the Preamble and Article IX of the 'Lome Peace Accord, Peace Agreement between 
the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone', 7 
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ignored. With its population of 120 million and its oil exports to the US, a 
connict in Nigeria would represent a major problem for powerful and 
influential countries. Nigeria's first step towards helping to heal the 
wounds of its neighbouring countries and simultaneously preventing the 
intensification of social tensions within its own boundaries, has been to 
hand Charles Taylor over to the Sierra Leonean SpeCial Court. This puts to 
an end a shameful example of impunity and is a significant symbolic step 
in the path towards stable peace. The prosecution of Taylor by the Sierra 
Leonean Special Court, after he was extradited from Nigeria following a 
request by the new Liberian President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, thus may 
assist the reconciliation process in the region. However, it may have 
negative consequences for reconciliatory processes, possibly only in the 
short term, in Liberia. 
At present. the relative tranquillity in Liberia and Sierra Leone provide 
the best opportunity in years to stabilise West Africa. Permanent stability 
will depend on the ability to address the causes of the conflict at the 
regional level. The state institutions need strengthening. while the misery 
of the economy should be tackled by redistributing the profits and even-
tually the ownership of the natural resources. Comprehensive interna-
tional suppon. consisting of peacekeeping and reconstruction operations, 
is still reqUired. as is economic growth. 
7.2 Reconciliation through justice 
For peace to endure, much more is needed, especially in the area of 
resources and resource allocation and control. Human rights abuses, such 
as those committed against the civilian population of the region. can only 
be healed if reconciliation goes hand in hand with justice. In this instance 
justice is a moral imperative. Those who allowed the mutilations, who 
encouraged the raping, who backed the kidnapping. who supported the 
killing, have to be punished. If not, the suffering of the people will remain 
unacknowledged and reconciliation alone will not be strong enough to 
lead the area into peaceful growth. 
In Sierra Leone transitional justice was addressed by a Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission (TRC) and is being addressed by the Special 
Court. m In the spirit of national reconciliation, the TRC dealt with human 
rights violations and abuses from the beginning of the Sierra Leone con-
flict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement in July 1999. A 
primary function of the TRC in Sierra Leone was to proVide healing to 
132 O'Connell J 'Where jmerest meets humanity How to end the war and support recon-
struction in Liberia. and the case for modest American leadership' (2004) 17 Harvard 
Human R!ghtsjournaI20R, 209. 
133 On the relationship between the TRC and the SpeCial Coun. Evenson concludes (hat 
the concurrent operation of rhe two has been complementary. assuming that such an 
'uncoordinated approach will nor be signjficantly damaging [0 the underlying goals of 
transitional justice, givell the particularities of the Sierra Leonean context'. For a pre-
cise analysis of coordination arrangements in transitional societies, see Evenson E 
'Truth and justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination between Commission and Court' 
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victims and perpetrators, as well as to average Sierra Leonean citizens. Its 
mandate included: the creation of an important historical record of the 
violations and abuses of human rights; to deal with impunity; to respond 
to the needs of victims; to promote healing and reconciliation; to prevent 
a repetition of abuses suffered; and to investigate and to report on the 
causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses to the fullest degree 
possible.134 
The Sierra Leone Special Court is an internationalised domestic court, a 
hybrid national and international court, and while supposedly independ-
ent of any government or organization, it is a domestic institution. The 
Special Court is prosecuting various categories of crimes under interna-
tional humanitarian law, including 'war crimes' and 'crimes against 
humanity', the latter not necessarily linked to war. The Special Court is 
also examining other serious violations of international and national law, 
such as the conscription of children into armed groups and the abuse of 
girls. The Special Court may pursue anyone responsible for serious crimes 
committed in Sierra Leone, including Sierra Leonean people who live in 
other countries and others who supported or directed atrocities, either 
from within Sierra Leone or from a foreign country. 
The Sierra Leonean Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission both have had numerous difficulties in reaching the inner 
part of the country to hear witnesses, to affirm their existence among the 
rural population and disseminate their findings. International funding and 
human resources are essential for rendering the two bodies workable and 
efficient. As long as prosecutions, indictments and witness hearings remain 
unknown to the majority of the population, reconciliation is bound to fail. 
However limited, justice should help Sierra Leone's national reconciliation. 
7.3 The way forward 
A strictly national policy of reconciliation will be inadequate to help Sierra 
Leone or Liberia deal thoroughly with its past ghosts. West Africa, as a 
whole, should become the primary objective of any foreign investment in 
the peaceful development of one of those wounded countries. Sierra Leone 
needs to reconcile with its neighbouring countries, primarily Liberia and 
Nigeria, but also with Guinea and Cote d'ivoire. Here reconciliation at the 
national level should go hand in hand with a broader policy aimed at 
bringing together all the countries that, directly or indirectly, profited or 
suffered from the conflicts. Because the war was not confined within 
certain national boundaries but ravaged the entire area, reconciliation 
should assume a regional dimension. The regional scope of the conflicts is 
demonstrated by the transnational jurisdiction of the Sierra Leone SpeCial 
Court. 
The main obstacles to achieving reconciliation in the region, and in 
third world countries in general, are socio-economic injustice and lack of 
134 See Hall Land Kazerni N 'Prospects for Justice and reconciliation in Sierra Leone' 
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access to resources. Redistribution of natural resources, diamonds, riches 
and political power all need to be addressed before any reconciliatory 
policy can succeed. Corruption is a major problem and hindrance for a 
democratic system. New national symbols are all-important in the crea-
tion of a popular feeling of belonging to a war-free state, a state which 
condemns the horrors of the past and is able to defend its people. Before 
the people can heed the call to reconcile, they should feel that there is the 
possibility of sharing resources, government jobs and military power. Creat-
ing real opportunities for civic participation and promoting a sense of inclu-
sion in all these key areas of civil society are cornerstones of stable peace. 
Underdevelopment, unemployment and conflict regarding the defini-
tion of borders are some of the worst problems that plague Africa and 
they ali undermine the achievement of national, regional, ethnic and 
political reconciliation. Still, the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Liberia were not triggered by border disputes. The various governments in 
the West African region supported armed groups in neighbouring states, 
not as a means of contesting the sovereignty or the internationally recog-
nised borders of other states, but as a regular instrument of foreign policy. 
Political, military and economic elites support warlords and their militias 
in exchange for control of natural resources. The goods are then sold 
internationally and the revenues are used as payment for new arms. For 
example, the war in southern is linked to Liberia through trade in 
weapons and marijuana. The international trade of goods brings a global 
dimension to the West African conflict the diamond trade, for example, 
reaches places as far away as Angola and Russia. Ellis refers to this exten-
sion and international interconnection of the West African conflicts as a 
'new generation of wars'. 
Through the global media, the fighting forces of these 'new wars' are 
alert to what is happening in the rest of the world, particularly in other 
conflict zones. It makes them aware of their power over international 
organisations and statutory institutions, In contrast to the stereotype of 
the small-scale, context-less African conflict, the fighting in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia is part of a regional war with global connections. Hoffman also 
believes that the warlords' knowledge of the effect of the atrocities on the 
global community was one of the triggers for them to worsen their behav-
iour towards civilians, because the combatants had the perception that 
'those who were most feared, who committed the worst abuses, would be 
those who received the greatest rewards'. "6 
The very nature of the conflicts renders former combatants one of the 
worst problems for achieving lasting peace and reconciliation. An array of 
initiatives is required to prevent fighting from recurring, Ideally combat-
ants should be re-integrated in the social community, but without a prior 
official sign of atonement, their victims would not accept their presence in 
their day-to-day life. The governments need to start healing the wounds of 
115 Ellis S 'War in West Africa' (200 t) 25 F1elcher Forum of World Affairs 33 34. 
136 Hoffman 0 'The civilian larget in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political power, military 
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society by bringing the worst criminals to justice. by establishing national 
holidays and devoting national funds to the memory of the victims. For-
mer combatants have to be re-educated in the moral and psychological 
values of their fellow citizens. Unless combatants can be provided with 
alternatives to their prolonged strategy of abuse used to survive during the 
wars. such as assurances of employment. the possibility of reintegrating 
them seems small. West Africa is trapped in a cycle of violence and 
injustice that does not foster reconciliation. Disarmament and demobilisa-
tion of the cruel militias is only the first step in the process towards rec-
onciliation and development. The frustration, the poverty, the 
unemployment, the social and political discontent that fuelled the wars all 
have to be addressed before peace and stability can be reached. 
Military intervention and security arrangements might bring temporary 
peace. m but stable peace in the region requires reconciliation as well. In 
addition to a strong military force to back up the peacekeeping force and 
foreign investments to restructure and retrain the army, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia both need the continuation of programmes preventing illegal 
exports of natural resources that funded the wars. Given the financial 
difficulties faced by a region ravaged by years of horrible conflicts. foreign 
funding is essential to sustain all these initiatives. The international recon-
struction efforts should be directed at facilitating the return of refugees, 
rebuilding the state, encouraging good governance and supporting devel-
opment. Foreign countries that have continued importing diamonds from 
the region without questioning their provenance should be the first to 
invest in the future development of the area. Belgium, for example. has 
continued importing diamonds from Liberia throughout the conflict, even 
though it was clear that the diamonds came from neighbouring Sierra 
Leone because the amount well exceeded the mining capability of 
Liberia. '3s 
O'Connell believes that: 
ending wars orten requires persuading or forcing predators who benefit from 
them to stop supporting Fighting factions. The West African war illustrates how 
warlords and politicians can profit from war. Diplomatic pressure and targeted 
sanctions (such as travel bans on them, their families, and close associates) can 
dissuade such people from disrupting a newly attained peace in the short-term, 
but persistent spoilers may need to be removed permanently through prosecu-
tion and imprisonment. The international community is just beginning to rec-
ognize this aspect of ending wars, which is especially relevant in Liberia. The 
Special Court ,[~r Sierra Leone is explicitly mandated to pursue people who fu-
elled the war. 
If both Nigeria and Cote d'ivoire would support a policy of regional recon-
Ciliation, it could also partially reconcile historic differences between 
English and French-speaking African countries. However useful it may be 
137 Savage T and Rahall J 'Sierra Leone: Hiswry hidden by horror' in Doxtader E alld Villa-
Vicencio C (eds) ThroughIire with water: The roots oI division and the potentialJor recon-
ciliation in AIrica (2003) 50. 
138 Ibid. 
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to keep the reconciliarory process rooted in the West African context, 
regional peacekeeping forces need to be supported by foreign forces. 
Even though foreign intervention is frequently perceived as an unwanted. 
intrusive and even damaging presence. the widespread involvement of 
local soldiers. who often took part in the most vicious crimes against the 
population, make it compulsory. As O'Connell puts it: 'In countries whose 
armed forces are militarily weak or prone ro disloyalty or corruption. 
internationally supported military reform can reduce the chances of war 
recurring' .'0 To enhance the reconciliatory aim of bringing together 
countries with differing colonial histories. a joint force composed of 
French and English troops is recommended. 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
The discussed models of reconciliatory policy could be useful in situations 
where international relations are at stake and are threatening not only 
peaceful cohabitation and collaboration between two neighbouring states. 
but also global peace and tranquillity as a whole. The examined realities of 
reconciliation demonstrate that such a transformative process involves 
ongoing, dynamic. long-term confrontation of the lacerating conflicts and 
the painful past. Diversity should be expected and accepted and creative 
new institutions should be tailored to the reconfigured relationships. As a 
process of political and societal change. reconciliation must also find 
broad. not necessarily unanimous. support among publics and include 
extensive, regularised and structural networks of bilateral ties. As was 
shown. reconciliation at the governmental level. which would allow and 
promote reconciliation at the societal level, is a precondition for successful 
reunification. In the past, contact between governments was essentially 
political - many of the examined reconciliatory policies have been initi-
ated and maintained only at government level, without considering the 
reality of modern policy-making. This is partly why reconciliation has 
often only remained an empty concept. devoid of public participation and 
widespread individual involvement. In contrast. modern policy-making, as 
a multifaceted organism, works through multiple institutions, many of 
which are not directly bound to the state's political apparatus. In today's 
world. multilateral contacts and intergovernmental organisations provide 
diverse channels for commercial, economic, cultural, humanitarian, en-
vironmental and trade issues that have increased the cooperative machin-
ery in our global community. 
Societies seeking reconciliation should consider the compatibility of 
fundamental values relevant to political decision-making. The two states 
attempting to reconcile should preferably be on the same level and share 
the same values, as far as possible. Because democratisation is a vital 
requirement for true reconciliation, they should ideally have the same 
popular support demonstrated through fair and democratic elections. 
Only if the government enjoys political legitimacy will reconciliation be 
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supported by the population and be engaged in earnestly. Although the 
policy should eventually develop beyond political beliefs, it is essential for 
it to be rooted in a legitimate democracy. A successful policy of reconcilia-
tion develops the capacity of governments to respond to each other's 
needs, messages and actions efficiently, swiftly and adequately, obviating 
the need to resort to violence. 141 
Attaining reconciliation can take many years to achieve in some states 
and may even remain elusive. France and Germany are still showing their 
engagement in and support of the reconciliation process. It is an on-going, 
perhaps never-ending process that must be nourished constantly, at all 
levels (societal, political, economic, educational and artistic). For a recon-
ciliatory policy - national or international - to work and result in stable 
peace, it must be kept active and alive for as long as it takes. Ultimately 
reconciliation must become a way of life. It can be compared to an ever-
burning fire, which can keep people warm throughout their daily life, be a 
sparkling light in darker times, and illuminate the path to a brighter way 
of living. 
In the Franco-German case the policy seems easier to identify because 
there are state bodies executing it at a visible level and bilateral institu-
tions which can be set up for a dynamic exchange interaction. Even if two 
different states do not wish to unify and want to maintain their separate 
identities, ongoing reconciliation remains indispensable to overcome past 
antagonisms and build common institutions. In contrast, where reconcil-
ing countries seek reunification, integration is the primary goal, so a 
reconciliatory policy can easily be misrepresented as aiming only at politi-
cal reunification. While such integration 'at home' (instead of on the inter-
national stage) may seem easier to accomplish, it could actually be more 
challenging, because, once reunification is achieved, reconciliation be-
comes less visible and can unravel itself between the creases of daily life. 
While reconciliation between countries that remain different countries is 
more formal, a matter of diplomacy, institutions and visible achievements, 
reconciliation within a newly unified people is a delicate matter of coexis-
tence. 
This is even truer in those cases in which reunification follows a civil 
war. In fact, internal war ceasefires are not the same as interstate truces. 
They are not made between ongoing, functioning agencies that can apply 
the provisions of the agreements while running their own affairs. Rather, 
they are made between weak, exhausted, wounded parties without the 
power or authority to monitor their implementation. For conflict-
management devices to work, the states must be restored. '42 In Europe it 
even took several centuries for some states to complete a transformation 
that evolved them into democracies. Such a temporal framework should 
be heeded when dealing with a reconciliation that entails reunifying two 
completely different political systems. One of the two may not yet be a 
141 Rock SR (fn 24 above) 4. 
142 Zartman W ·Cowardly lions: Missed opportunities for dispUle settlement' (2002-2003) 
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democratic state and would therefore require a comprehensive transfor-
mation. Such a change cannot be sudden and fast, because the introduc-
tion of a liberalised economy and a plural political scene does not 
necessarily bring more political participation or more economic wealth. 
Hence a divided country seeking reunification must implement a recon-
ciliatory policy before political unity can be attained; to accom-plish social 
and emotional unity, it should become even stronger afterwards. 
In some cases the promotion of democracy can be seen as a method of 
enhancing peace between and within states, as part of a broader policy of 
reconciliation. In divided societies, however, the adversarial polities of 
democracy can sharpen confrontations and conflicts instead of fostering 
greater tolerance for different interests and opinions. As Robert Dahl has 
noted: 'In democratic countries political conflict is not merely normal, it is 
generally thought to be rather healthy'." Like democracy, capitalism also 
encourages conflict because it creates inequalities that have historically 
fuelJed resentment and confrontation. Regardless of a country's level of 
economic development, highly unequal distributions of wealth appear to 
be strongly associated with violent political conflict. The advanced indus-
trialised states have responded to such issues by implementing welfare 
policies designed to redistribute income to poorer segments of sOciety. 
Where two different economic and political states want to unify, or par-
ticularly where a communist system is absorbed into a capitalist one, this 
strategy should be employed. The practical examples show that where a 
communist country has been absorbed by a capitalist state, the latter 
must build in a strong welfare system to sustain the social tissue of the 
absorbed country and water down potential social collisions and conflicts. 
The more developed, powerful and/or absorbing country must take care 
not to place the principal burden of adjustment on the poorest and most 
vulnerable groups of SOCiety, because this could fuel political instability 
and corrode reconciliation. The developmental stage of democracy in the 
particular country should thus form the parameter in evaluating the 
probability and possibilities of the reconciliation process, and patterns of 
diplomacy and cooperation should be modified accordingly. In some cases, 
dividing warring parties can be more successful in lessening tensions and 
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